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INTRODUCTION
In September of this year, a video emerged from Libya showing a 15 year old child, a refugee from Darfur in Sudan, cowering in fear from an armed individual demanding money, and faux-shooting at the boy with the empty gun to intimidate the victim. This video has showed a snapshot into the daily abuse and torture that some migrants have faced in their pursuit of a better life in Europe, but according to several NGOs and official organisiations such as the UN, these abuses are far too common.
But, it is also simple to reduce the suffering of a migrant into a statistic, one which does not account for the systematic challenges facing them throughout their journey. From the ongoing violence and wars within their countries of origin such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, to abuses at the hands of government-sanctioned militias in Libyan detention centres as well as criminal human traffickers, to the hostile reception at European ports of entry determined to invest in pushback procedures in the Medditeranean Sea. For policymakers to even attempt to remedy these atrocities, all links within the migratorary route are broken and require revaluation. So instead, this paper will explore the realities of those migrants, like the aforementioned child, who are attempting to flee violence within Darfur, and discuss the challenges that they often experience throughout their journey to find a better life free from conflict. The paper concludes with some recommendations towards the international community that could help alleviate some of the terrible suffering that these migrants often experience.
ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN DARFUR
In recent years, Sudan has faced a period of profound political upheaval. Long-reigning autocrat, Omar al-Bashir, was deposed in 2019 following unprecedented popular protests against his regime. The events led to the installation of a transitional government, that involved a temporary power-sharing agreement between key civilian and military leaders. However, in 2021 a military coup saw those military figures seize complete power from the tentative civilian-administration, returnig the State to a period of renewed autocracy. Throughout these years, and for many years prior to this peirod, ordinary Sudanese have struggled with poverty and governmental oppression. Sudan has also itself hosted over a million refugees from neighbouring countries, such as South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, the latter itself embroiled with a deadly war in Tigray.
Despite this, the situation has been even more dire in the western region of Darfur. Infamously the place of genocide during the early 2000s, during which time the government-sponsored militia, the Janjaweed, was heavily implicate in a systematic campaign of murder, rape and terror on the civilian population, Darfur has continued to endure violence and oppression. The Norweigan Refugee Council (NRC) reported in 2021 that Darfurian villages continue to be looted and burnt while violence continues to claim the lives of hundreds of civilians, leading to staggering levels of displacement.
The NRC estimated that in 2021 alone, more than 430,000 Sudanese, mostly of Darfurian origin, were displaced by armed conflict, adding to over three million internally-displaced persons over the past 20 years. This extreme figure, the NRC claims, can at least be partially attributed to the end of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2020, whose presence had created a natural neutral inhibitor to the scale of violence. Since its implementation in 2007, UNAMID’s principle objectives were to protect civilians within Darfur and facilitate the delivery of humaniatrian assistance, and consequently its removal signifies the end of a substantial deterrent to violence. Under these conditions of significant violence and oppression towards civilians in their country of origin, it is unsurprising that some have sought a way out through migration towards Europe. But, for the majority having to resort to irregular means to migrate, this often means the difficult decision to utilise human traffickers based within Libya.
EXPLOITATION WITHIN LIBYA
Unlike what may be an assumption, Sudanese migrants, including Darfurian migrants, have migrated to Libya for the past several decades oftentimes for seasonal work involving trips between the two African nations. According to a report by the Small Arms Survey, local representatives in Sudan estimated between 250,000 and 500,000 Sudanese living in Libya in 2020. A more conservative estimate by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) puts that number at 41,000 in 2017, though this lower figure does not include pre-exisiting Sudanese communities in Libya.
These communities do not treat all Sudanese communities equally, reflecting biases and affiliations present in Sudan, particularly in relation to how close a community is to the government. Those from Darfur are not usually treated favourably; for instance, with reports of the Sudanese embassy in Tripoli denying nationality to Darfurian migrants. As with the reported story in the introduction, Sudanese migrants are frequently kidnapped for ransom by militia groups, including those affiliated with the UN-sponsored administration in Tripoli. It then falls upon the communities within Libya to pay the ransoms, with the Small Arms Survey estimating that the ransom fees can be up to LYD 35,000 (USD 7,000). Of course, it is not common for these ransoms to be paid anyway, given the financial limitations of these communities.
Nonetheless there are legal and safe ways to leave Libya, as Darfur is one of nine places of origin where people are eligible for asylum, and can thus be registered as asylum seekers or refugees with the UNHCR to be hopefully ressetled in a safe country. UNHCR figues from October 2022 show 40.6% of the 43,000 migrants registered as refugees and asylum seekers by UNHCR in Libya were Sudanese/Darfurians, the greatest proportion of all refugees and asylum seekers in Libya with the next highest being Syrians at 38.3%. However, the Small Arms Survey notes that this figure represented only a fraction of all Sudanese living in Libya.
Being registered is not the end of the story either. Registrations with UNHCR can expire and require re-registration, and given the lack of availibility of ressetlement opportunities in Europe and North America, some have been ressettled within sub-Saharan Africa such as Rwanda and Chad. And to exacerbate the issues, the prioritisation of the UNHCR upon those most at risk, i.e. women and children, has actually caused more wives and children to make the migratory journey to Libya and accompany their husbands, fathers and brothers.
And what of those inelegible for asylum? The IOM has instead promoted its system of ‘voluntary humanitarian returns’, despite the knowledge that many returns are not ‘voluntary’ given the coersion of adverse conditions affecting those in detention centres. These returns have also been documented to affect those eligible for asylum, such as those from Darfur. According to reports made to the UK Home Office in its ‘Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan (2018), during January 2016 and August 2018 the number of IOM-facilitated returns of Sudanese nationals back to Khartoum from Libya dwarfed the number from any other country, with 767 returns recorded compared to the next highest figure of 448 from Egypt. What awaits them upon re-arrival in the govenrment stronghold of Khartoum? At least one case in 2017 was reported in the Small Arms Survey study of a Darfuri migrant being arrested and tortured immediately upon arrival in Khartoum airport.
This also bears great similarity to the widely-publisiced cases of Sudanese nationals deported from Belgium in 2017, who were immediately tortured upon arrival in Khartoum. Before Omar al-Bashir’s fall from power in 2019, there were the Small Arms Survey again found that the Sudanese embassy was actively lobbying the GNA in Tripoli, UNHCR and the IOM to not allow Darfurians to be registered as refugees and instead be returned to Sudan. Since then, this political pressure has not been reported, although the IOM’s lack of ‘voluntary returns’ has been impacted due to the decreased access to migrant communities within Libya due to the ongoing war.
NO EUROPEAN SAFE HARBOUR
Despite eligibility for asylum, many Darfurian migrants make the perilous Medditeranean Sea crossing to Europe. Testimonies speak of the terrible conditions:
“We crossed in rubber dinghies – some were leaking; people had to put their fingers over the hole in the rubber. We spent two days on the boat. The engine cut out. We were eventually arrested by the Italian navy.”
Due to a lack of an official mechanism for recording fatalities, it is difficult to state the exact number of casualties of migrants making this journey, but conservative estimates place the figure in the tens of thousands since 2014. MSF reports, for example, that up to 1,000 people died trying to cross the Medditeranean solely between the seven months of January and July 2021.
Upon arrival in Italy, some refugees will intentionally avoid the mechanisms of refugee reception centres and processing camps in order to quickly transit out of Italy to other European countries. Others will stay in camps, such as the Red Cross-run camp in the Italian-French border town of Ventimiglia, taking an opportunity to receive humaniatrian assistance by sacrificing their anonymity from the authorities that will often take months to process their request for asylum.
The reception of Europe to migrants in these centres has been mixed. There are accounts of some Italian citizens helping migrants with donations of food, and some Darfurian migrants have said that nothing in Europe is as bad as their experiences in Libya; however there is evidence of hostile attitudes. In a survey conducted by the Refugee Rights Data Project, over 90% of migrants in Ventimiglia had suffered verbal abuse while in Italy. A further 40% said they had experienced physical force by Italian police, and 50% said the same about French police who were attempting to keep migrants contained within Italy and prevent crossing at the French-Italian border.
Anti-migrant political rhetoric also appears popular in Italy. For example, Matteo Salvini, leader of the far-right League party, said in August of this year that there has been a, “blast of arrivals in Ventimiglia, where the presence of immigrants is creating chaos and problems for volunteers, who are unable to provide adequate assistance.” Recently, in September 2022, another far-right candidate Giorgia Meloni was elected as Prime Minister in Italy, with her party, Brothers of Italy, perceived as a successor to Mussolini-style fascism. One of Meloni’s key pledges was to enforce a naval blockade in the Medditeranean Sea, as a means to screen refugees off-shore. Lawmakers have expressed shock at such a move, with it seen by many as a violation of international law. However, the possibility of off-shore migrant processing centres, that is processing centres based outside of Europe for migrants attempting to reach Europe, is becoming a normalised idea. Denmark and the UK are pursuing such deals with Rwanda for instance, despite legal challenges impeding their immediate operation.
What is more likely in the short-term, however, is that Meloni, along with the EU in general, will keep funding returns from the Libyan side of the sea; funding naval operations by the Libyan authorities to intercept smugglers in the sea and transport them back to Libya. As we have seen, these same authorities are deeply implicated in recorded abuses of migrants within Libya, given their association with non-accountable militias in charge of detention centres as well as many of the human trafficking rings.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that there are several protracted issues affecting all stages of the migratory route between Sudan and the EU, but there is also responsisbility that the international community, including the EU, should shoulder in allowing such terrible conditions to occur. The violence in Darfur is situated in decades of alienation and oppression, however UNAMID was a successful intervention by the international commnity to mitigate the level of violence. The end of this mandate has allowed violence to spiral out of control once more.
The terrible conditions affecting migrants within Libya have been reported and recorded for several years. But the fact that it is international money supporting the Tripoli-government, and consequently the militias in charge of the horrific detention centres and trafficking rings is a terrible indightment of what the international community is willing to tolerate in order to contain migration flows. Likewise, the IOM should also be held accountable for its part in coercing ‘voluntary’ returns, and for not allowing those eligible for asylum under international law, including those from Darfur, to reach a suitable point of safe harbour.
And upon arrival in the EU, the conditions of migrant reception are not fair and just. Reports of police brutality by Italian and French authorities are unacceptable and must be investigated thoroughly and fairly. Anti-migrant rhetoric by political figures does not help the situation, but neither is it fair that the points of entry, in this case Italy, should be solely responsible for hosting newly arrived migrants. The EU should do more to ensure that the bruden of reception is shared more fairly between Member States.
It is clear that migration flows will continue, so long as the conditions of poverty, war and oppression keep affecting innocent people in their countries of origin. Failing to sufficiently tackle these deep-seated issues will allow these problems to proliferate. And, in the meantime, the EU needs to improve its channels for asylum seekers and refugees to safely and legally seek destinations that they are entitled to under international law, and not obfusciate the process or pass the responsibility on to third parties.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the European Union:
- Investigate claims that EU funds are being used by the Libyan authorities to pay for militias to torture migrants in detention centres or exploit them in human trafficking rings, and immediately cease such funding if found complicit.
- Improve reception centres for migrants within EU ports of entry so that migrants’ reception processes are completed faster and develop means to share the reception of migrants between Member States while their claims for status, such as asylum or as a refugee, are assessed.
- Investigate and hold police and other European authorities accountable under local laws for incidents of police brutality and oppression towards vulnerable migrants.
To the International Organisation for Migration:
- Immediately cease deporting, or assisting the deportation of, migrants eligible for asylum or refugee status, such as those from Darfur, back to their countries of origin where they may face persecution and torture.
- Ensure that migrants in Libya, especially those entitled to or in possession of asylum or refugee status, are informed of all their options under international law so that they might make better informed choices. Do not posit a voluntary return as the only option available to them.
To the United Nations:
- Consider reimplementing the mandate of UNAMID in Darfur, to help discourage violence towards civilians as well as assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid.