INTRODUCTION
On 21 March 2018, the Brussels International Center (BIC) organized a high-level discussion at the European Parliament titled “The EU in Libya: A New Migration Policy for Long-Term Stability”. The event focused on the impact of the policies of the European Union (EU), and its partners in the region such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in regards to Libya and migration management, with special emphasis on its shortcomings. The BIC’s previous article “Libya: The EU’s Policy of Migrant Containment”[1] highlighted some of these issues too. During the constructive discussion, various provocative topics were raised at the event to address some of the complexities of the EU/Libyan relationship as well as its impact on vulnerable migrants. Consequently, this paper reflects on these issues and has focused on four critical areas for reflection:
- What aspects of the current EU strategy to address issues affecting migrants in Libya are flawed with emphasis on the 2016 New Partnership Framework[2] and the 2015 EU Emergency Trust Fund[3] (EUTF)?
- Does the current strategy to encourage and implement voluntary repatriations by the IOM, UNHCR and EU violate international obligations to protect vulnerable migrants?
- Who is the “Libya” that is a partner of the EU? Does EU policy presuppose an engagement with a state-actor, i.e. Libya that does not have the domestic potency or legitimacy to implement those obligations?
- What political resolutions within Libya are necessary in order to enact positive change for all vulnerable people, both migrants and Libyan citizens themselves?
The Current “Partnership”
The Partnership Framework with Libya involves high-level dialogue with the Libyan authorities, including various summits and meetings, and increasing security cooperation. The latter includes the somewhat controversial EU Common Security and Defence Policy EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia, in effect since May 2015, which intercepts smugglers across the Mediterranean Sea as well as assisting in capacity building and training of the Libyan coastguard. The EUTF projects in Libya, worth many millions of Euros, have focused on migration management and assisting returns and repatriations, in cooperation with existing organizations such as the IOM. Whilst there are aspects of EUTF projects that focus on restoring local governance in areas of Libya to assist local communities in hosting migrants, the latest EUTF projects in Libya have increasingly focused on supporting the Libyan coastguard in what a recent report by CONCORD[4] suggests reflects the EU’s approach to securitizing migration.
Returning to the 21 March event, this approach is well known and documented amongst observers. That the European Union has focused on preventing illegal migration, at seemingly all costs, is a major point of contention and controversy. Some have speculated that EUTF funds have reached militias and human traffickers through projects aimed at supporting the Libyan Coastguard, including the infamous al-Ammu militia. Perhaps a more salient question regarding this is not who money should be going to, but rather why EU money is reaching militia groups. The answer is political. Again, who is the Libyan Coastguard?
Consider Libya’s current fragmentized political scene, with more than one government and multiple armed groups in different territories across the country. The EU currently supports the UN-backed Government of National Accords (GNA) Presided by Ali Fayez Al-Sarraj. However, the GNA’s sphere of influence is largely limited to parts of Tripoli. A rival Government based in Tobruk linked to the considerable force of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), has control over much of Libya’s east. In addition, this government has support from key external actors such as Egypt and Russia. Also, there are many groups who do not appear to side with either such as in Libya’s southern region the Fezzan, unsurprisingly the border region from which the majority of human trafficking into Libya takes place[5].
By implementing EUTF projects in a context where the partner is a weak, unrecognized Government, there are multiple consequences. Firstly, it is unsurprising that EU funds have reached non-GNA actors. For instance, the instability and consequential danger for international actors has relegated the majority of international actors, such as NGOs and the EU Delegation to Libya[6], to operating from neighboring Tunisia and instead giving on-the-ground implementation to local actors. Secondly, there cannot be a true claim to be a traditional third country partner that the EU is working with without legitimacy within its own territory. The Libyan Coastguard reflects this chaotic political climate; how can a state instrument expect to function effectively when the state itself is still contested? Returning to the original point, within this complex political landscape it is absolutely expected that data and figures from the region are questionable, inaccurate and contested. But then again, we would expect this of any recent post-conflict country; the war which saw the fall of Muammar Gaddafi happened in 2011, less than a decade ago. The country has not recovered from those scars, neither politically, socially nor economically.
Voluntary Repatriations
One aspect of the discussion involved addressing the ramifications of the current strategy to encourage voluntary repatriations of stranded migrants. The IOM, UNHCR and EU have all publically praised the outcomes of this scheme[7]. Between November 2017 and February 2018, UNHCR[8] reported over one-thousand migrants have been resettled via this scheme. However, the vast majority of migrants were resettled to Niger. This leads to a set of rather complex questions.
Firstly, whilst recognizing the minimal layer of success in ensuring a basic level of security for some migrants, is the EU pushing responsibility to third countries? Indeed, is this legally justifiable under international humanitarian law to do so, especially if those migrants face insecurity in the receiving countries? Are all migrants being treated the same? For instance, in the same report as above UNHCR stated that around three-hundred migrants were repatriated to Italy. What was the criterion for selecting these migrants to be allowed to reach Europe and not the other seven-hundred?
This latter point raises another serious issue in that Libya is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and has serious limitations on the number of nationalities that it recognizes as refugees. It only recognizes seven nationalities eligible for protection by the UNHCR, consequently not acknowledging the refugee status of, for instance, Eritreans who are then lacking sufficient legal protections for their security. This complexity is another feature that suggests that the EU should take a more proactive role in protecting groups of migrants within Libya.
Who Is Libya?
Libya is a territory without a domestically potent government; citizens without legitimate representatives. It is a country where power has become fragmented between Tripoli and Tobruk, and yet even both of these governments have no jurisdiction in parts of the country’s remote south. With this power struggle, a vacuum has emerged that has been filled with militias, Islamists and criminals, whilst state-based organizations such as the Libyan border guard, or the oil industry have been left behind.
For every step towards political clarity, more confusion mires the political landscape. For instance, while the Islamist group IS was forced out of Sirte by Haftar’s LNA, they still maintain a presence on the ground. Remnants of Libya’s former regime still enjoy vast support amongst Libya’s population. Libya’s population is young, almost 80% of all Libyans are twenty-five or younger, and with the majority of their adult life spent in a conflict-zone there seems to be a nostalgia for the relative prosperity and stability of Libya’s past. In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that recently freed convicted war-criminal Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is now publically making a statement to run in any upcoming Libyan election, and preliminary indications suggest he would enjoy widespread support[9].
With the mounting talks of possible elections this year, Haftar has indicated growing impatience with the implementation of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement [10], also known as the Schirat Agreement, which was then heralded as a breakthrough in implementation a transition to democratic elections in Libya [11] but has been mired in impasses between Libya’s political players. This is not to be taken lightly as the LNA have significant military muscle, and recognition from key third countries including Egypt, an important ally on Libya’s eastern border. The LNA have been effective in stabilizing parts of Libya’s east and central regions, and it is doubtful that without the LNA that IS would have been expelled from Sirte. The GNA by comparison seem to be weaker, even in the GNA’s main base of Tripoli evidence suggests that their jurisdiction is so impotent that parts of the capital remain highly fragile and dangerous. The last thing that the Libyan people need is another civil war.
The Primacy of a Political Solution
In the meantime, the EU cannot implement an effective migration strategy in Libya while Libya’s political scene remains so fragmented and chaotic. However, a political resolution that restores domestic power and legitimacy to Libya’s government will help to resolve these issues. A government acknowledged across all of Libya is a first step to allow all branches of Libyan society to function, whilst bolstering the economy, addressing grievances at complex border regions and purging the country of rogue militias. In order to achieve this, all political parties in Libya must be brought to the negotiating table in order to accommodate the polarized grievances within the country. For while there is no universally accepted government in Libya at present, in its absence the Libyan people themselves must be able to determine the future of their country politically. The EU, and other international observers, must help this process. The 2015 Libyan Political Agreement was a step in the right direction but has stalled due to a lack of compromise between Libya’s differing groups. Its future success and the ultimate goal of free, fair and domestically recognized elections depend upon dialogue between aggrieved parties so that all accept its result, a point emphasized by Ghassan Salame of the UN Support Mission in Libya [12].
The EU continues to bury its head in the sand, recognizing domestic pressure to curb migration without addressing its root causes. Libya is by no means the only cause of migration and any overall EU migration strategy must address problems in countries of origin while providing better legal pathways for safe and fair migration. However the instability of Libya provides a space for human traffickers to operate in and exploit, which makes migrant lives suffer horrific abuses in the process. If the EU truly wishes to implement a strategy in Libya such as entering into a partnership, it must assist the domestic negotiations needed to stabilize Libya’s political scene and actually ensure that Libya as a partner is able to function correctly.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The BIC recommends to the European Union,
- Bring together a wider group of stakeholders to consider strategies for engagement, developed within a long-term framework. Opening lines of communication among key actors can be essential to assess whether other forms of engagement are feasible.
- Expand legal pathways for migrants to access Europe, especially for seasonal workers, and improve overall provision for migrants and asylum-seekers with complex, often undefined, legal statuses.
- Reassess the efficiency of the Partnership Framework and EU Emergency Trust Fund in relation to Libya, and investigate the most effective means to ensure the well-being of both Libyan citizens and travelling migrants.
- Engage with Libyan authorities to urgently expand the list of seven nationalities recognized by the Libyan government as eligible for international protection by the UNHCR.
- Recommit to the extraterritorial applicability of all fundamental rights and refugee law obligations, and recognize that international responsibilities cannot be displaced to third countries.
- Assist in monitoring planned Libyan elections this year to ensure a fair and transparent outcome.
The BIC recommends to the all representatives of Libya’s political scene, including the Government of National Accords and Libyan National Army,
- Continue to commit in good faith to the resolutions of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, and its principles of a negotiated settlement that represents all citizens of Libya.
- Foster an environment to allow for fair and transparent elections to allow the Libyan people the freedom to determine their own political destiny, and publically commit to respecting the outcome of that vote.
