Iraq is in transition. The May parliamentary elections have reshuffled the cards and the political rules of the Iraqi game are to be redefined. Muqtada Al Sadr - a Shi’a religious leader and former warlord who used to work with Iran against US forces- just gained the majority of seats in Iraq’s elections and is now representing the biggest Shi’a bloc in Iraq. He will have an important role in shaping the new Iraqi political sphere. This political sphere however, is under severe pressure from different angles. This series of articles will shed light on Iraq's internal and external challenges while mapping the balancing game for stability to set foot in a country that suffered decades of war, foreign interference and embargoes. Whether Sadr's nationalist and social justice ambitions will be able to materialize will depend on his capacities to balance both internal interests and trans-boundary issues, without provoking its federal counterpart or its neighbors.
The struggle against ISIS facilitated inter-regional security cooperation. The ISIS defeat by the Iraqi security forces however, raises the question whether the incentives for cooperation are still on the table. Internally, Iraq has to manage a number of current challenges, including a institutionalization and transformation of its formal state bodies, still infected with corruption and lack of transparency. Secondly, the Government will have to manage a highly fragmented society, characterized by intrastate identities while suffering severe socio- economic problems. To make things more complicated, Iraq has to balance its interests from a multi-level governance point of view. Although the Kurdistan region of Iraq is a federal part of the country, it has been taking an increasingly distant position vis-a-vis the central government in Baghdad. In trying to keep the Kurdistan Regional Government in line, it had to take drastic measures that resulted in budget cuts and a flight embargo, among others, isolating the de facto autonomous region.
Finally, there is the powerful neighbor of Iran, with who Iraq, after 2003, holds strong economic and cultural ties, but whose influence in the Iraqi national security apparatus is perhaps of a more worrying nature.
Internal or External Relations: the Multi Layered Nature of Iraqi Politics
The following section argues that any current and future government in Baghdad will have to balance governance on at least three different levels. First of all, on the domestic scale, Baghdad will have to find a way to deal with Iraq's most current challenges: the model of statehood it will promote and its dealings with Iraq's societal mosaic. The global financial crisis and the plummeting global oil prices have had a negative effect on the government’s income, which is largely dependent on oil revenues. A demographic boom puts further pressure on the domestic labor market, with a public sector that is bursting its banks and that will unlikely be able to absorb future labor market new comers in its current form. How will Iraq be able to sustain the many challenges regarding its internal affairs while trying to come up with alternative programs for more transparency, accountability, non-interference and anti-corruption? Moreover, how will the country deal with the inclusion of the wide array of ethnic and religious minorities that serve transnational agendas without provoking its neighbors’ own domestic one?
Finding a workable solution with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Secondly, on the federal level Iraq has to find a workable solution in order to address the challenges between Erbil and Bagdad. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been through some drastic episodes since the consolidation of its autonomy. The region was initially on a promising path towards prosperity and democracy. Moreover, Kurdistan was becoming a unique, regional strategic partner that was on speaking terms with all the major regional and international players.
However, Iraq is now facing growing internal challenges that have manifested themselves both domestically and federally. The large oil reserves, which remain one of the Kurds main assets, have made them walk into the same trap as many developing economies before them. In economically thriving times, oil served as a tool to take a more independent stance from Iraq's central governing structure. Kurdish opportunism in relying on its own oil assets made them engage in direct trade dealings with Turkey, by cutting a deal to build one gas and two oil pipelines directly from Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq to Turkey without the approval of Baghdad. As a result, the relations between Baghdad and Erbil deteriorated rapidly and Baghdad cut the federal allocation budget to the KRG which was, among others, used to pay civil servants salaries.
The collapse of the global oil market has put the KRG back in its place. The lack of a diversified domestic economy could not compensate the loss of revenues and the KRG was further weakened over party lines, economic mismanagement and corruption. The referendum for independence in 2017 is perhaps best perceived as an opportunistic attempt for regaining legitimacy among an increasingly frustrated population. However, Baghdad showed its force and took drastic measures for the KRG to walk back in line.
Cross-border dynamics between Iran and Iraq
Finally we argue that there is a third, external component to Iraqi politics. Iraq’s domestic sphere shares important concerns with neighboring Iran. After many years of blunt hostilities between the two countries, the fall of Saddam allowed for an easing of tensions and initial cautious relations that have, over time, consolidated into a rather firm relationship. The Iranian Islamic Republic has shown its support for the Shia dominated Iraqi government and has played an important role in the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq through economic and cooperation agreements.
The struggle against ISIS has provided a unique opportunity for cooperation among all three different entities. Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iraqi army and Iran-backed militia's within the Hashd al Shaabi fought alongside against the IS insurgence in Iraq. However, after the ISIS defeat, above mentioned hierarchies within the Popular Mobilization Forces showed that the Pro-Iranian factions are an important factor to take into account. Although Sadr, winner of the recent parliamentary elections, has expressed that it is not his objective to confront Iran, Iraq will have to deal with the Iranian infiltration in its security apparatus, alas, the Iranian long arm in Iraqi affairs.
Future Perspectives for a Regional Order
One area where this Iranian influence will be problematic is when it comes to ethnic and religious minority groups in border regions. Recent times have seen waves of increasingly large, violent protests in both Iran and Iraq. Basra has been the latest scene of violent confrontations between government forces and protesters who have been objecting lack of electricity, clean water and available jobs. Roughly 50 kilometers east, across the border of Iran, residents of the parched city of Khorramshahr are increasing public pressure on President Hassan Rouhani by transferring their grievances over water into anti-regime anger.
The Khorramshahr protests, were the latest sign of public discontent over Iran’s faltering economy, sliding currency, and the prospect of tough new US sanctions. Earlier this year, austerity measures by the Kurdistan Regional Government resulted in days of protests in which civil servants, mostly teachers and healthcare workers clashed with security forces while raising their concerns regarding unpaid wages across different communities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).The above-mentioned examples of popular protests related to government failure assume that Iraq, Kurdistan and Iran face similar internal challenges. It seems to confirm the hypothesis that the transnational connection between populations that reside in the border regions of Iran and Iraq are sources of further escalation.
However, we should also be wary of drawing conclusions too fast, as the issues of concern, such as corruption, mismanagement or rentier behavior, each have strong roots directly related to the differing national contexts, its political debates, and its position relative to the rest of the region. Iran, currently crisis managing its own internal state of affairs, often regards these groups as a fifth column of hostile external forces. Moreover, it tends to transform these communities into an important tool for regime legitimacy through Iranian nationalism. Iraq, in its turn, deals with these issues as well, both on a national and federal level. Yet, if ambitions for a nationalist, more inclusive Iraq are likely to succeed, Iraq’s leadership will have to find a way in balancing the ambitions for inclusiveness while not interfering with Iranian interests.