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Sudan and Iran: Resumption of Diplomatic Ties

In July, Iran and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) resumed diplomatic relations after eight years of a bilateral nadir. The agreement was already signed in October 2023, but the new Iranian ambassador, Hassan Shah Hosseini, was only received by SAF’s chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who dispatched the Sudanese ambassador to Tehran, Abdelaziz Hassan Saleh, more than half a year later.

In early February, Sudan’s acting foreign minister Ali Al Sadiq had already travelled to Tehran and met with former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and his counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who were both killed in a helicopter accident later in May. Three months before the announcement in October 2023, Al Sadiq and Amir-Abdollahian had met in the Azerbaijan capital of Baku in the first high-level public meeting since 2016.

Then, Sudan cut diplomatic ties with Iran after Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran was attacked by Iranian protesters, following the execution of the prominent Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. At that time, Sudan’s recent government under President Omar Hassan al-Bashir enjoyed close ties with the Saudi leadership, and supported the kingdom’s military campaign by sending troops to Yemen. Resultingly, the relations between Sudan and Iran cooled down. but have nonetheless significantly improved in light of the brutal internal conflict between the SAF and its rival, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), which broke out in April 2023.

The Sudanese Humanitarian Catastrophe: no Solution in Sight

The reconciliation comes at a critical time: Sudan finds itself in a catastrophic quagmire as the RSF, SAF and other players fight for power, economic resources and political superiority in a militarised political settlement. The power struggle has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe and put Sudan on the brink: tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, more than 25 million Sudanese nationals are in urgent need of aid, and 10.7 million people are seeking safety within the country, many of whom have been displaced twice or more by warfare, famine and flooding. By May 2024, more than two million Sudanese had fled the country, most of them to neighbouring countries such as South Sudan (675,000), Chad (604,000) and Egypt (500,000). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the humanitarian situation in Sudan is at  ‘a catastrophic breaking point’. Furthermore, international humanitarian relief is restricted by the RSF and SAF, which further worsens the situation of the civilian population. Consequently, the Sudan humanitarian appeal was only 32% funded (USD 874 million out of the required USD 2.7 billion) as of the beginning of August.

Yet, various mediation efforts by the international community and regional players have resulted in no substantial success, as they lack coherent coordination and the real commitment of the warring parties. Soon after the war started, US-Saudi negotiations took place in the Saudi city of Jeddah, and several short-term ceasefire agreements were signed. However, fighting continued, and the Jeddah talks were suspended in December 2023. A few weeks later, a new format of negotiations started in Bahrain, in which representatives of the RSF and SAF – as well as from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – participated. Again, substantial results were not achieved. Other formal mediation initiatives include formats facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in June 2023, and the African Union’s AU High-Level Panel in February 2024. Subsequently, in August, new negotiations to mitigate the crisis and agree on a ceasefire in Geneva were co-organised by Switzerland and the US, including representatives from the United Nations, the Arab League, the African Union, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, the SAF stayed away, although they were in touch with the process facilitators telephonically. The RSF sent a delegation, but at some point, it was reported that they did not want to take part in talks. The SAF has expressed its intention to plan separate talks in Cairo.

Pouring Oil in the Sudanese Fire: Accusations of Iranian Drones’ Delivery to the SAF

In this complex and contested situation, the growing Iranian engagement in Sudan is of multifold relevance, as it could further destabilise the domestic and regional situation. Recently, Iran has been accused of supplying the SAF with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as drones and military equipment, thus violating the UN arms embargo. In January, several news outlets reported that Iranian-manufactured drones called Mohajer-6 and Ababil were delivered from Iran to Sudan. SAF officials denied such accusations, whereas the RSF has claimed to have shot down at least three such drones in Greater Khartoum. Additionally, an Iranian cargo plane was said to have been heading from an Iranian airport in Bandar Abbas to Port Sudan, where the SAF is based. With the alleged Iranian support, the SAF was capable of regaining territory in strategically relevant areas of Sudan such as Omdurman, Nyala and Wad Madani, following a period in which it faced major setbacks against the RSF.

After the outbreak of the clashes in April 2023, the RSF rapidly seized control of many areas across the country, including a significant portion of Omdurman and locations surrounding the capital Khartoum. In light of such military defeats, the SAF became more interested in external assistance to strengthen its combat position, which could have resulted in a closer security partnership with Iran. In geostrategic terms, the SAF is instrumentalising closer cooperation with Iran to signal to the United States that they also have alternatives if Western support is reduced and if the US and its allies do not exert more pressure on the RSF. However, such an approach is a delicate balancing act, as it could undermine the SAF’s credibility on the US side. Economically however, Iran could supply the SAF with oil imports, as local oil production has been seriously damaged during the ongoing conflict.

Iran’s Engagement in Sudan: Driving Forces and Risks

For Iran, the resumption of ties with the SAF offers both chances and challenges. On the one hand, the Iranian government is highly interested in gaining a foothold in the Horn of Africa. As part of its “Neighbors First” approach, Iran considers the SAF as a tactical partner in order to improve relations with Arab states and gain strategic access to the Red Sea. In doing so, Iran aims to break its international isolation, enhance trade and business ties with regional partners, and gain more leverage in theatres of conflict such as Sudan.

As relations with the West are driven by deep contestation, chances for reconciliation with the United States or Europe remain grim. Therefore, Iran follows a multi-alignment strategy in a multipolar world order by deepening ties with non-Western players such as China and Russia, but also with Arab countries such as Sudan, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain.

Furthermore, Iran’s provision of military equipment to Sudan’s SAF could also send a signal to other potential buyers of Iranian weaponry that consider Iran’s engagement in Sudan as an indicator of Tehran’s capable military industry. Illustratively, in 2020, Sudan’s military junta agreed to normalise relations with Israel under the framework of the so-called ‘Abraham Accords’. This agreement was mainly motivated by Sudan’s need to stop the sanctions regime and improve relations with the US. However, since then, the SAF has not received substantial military equipment from the US, and it has taken a rather anti-Israeli rhetoric since the start of the Israel-Gaza conflict. In the long run, such engagement could thus diversify Iranian security partnerships and promote its ‘drone diplomacy’.

Iran’s expansion in Sudan also grants Tehran direct access to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, which has emerged as a contested theatre of conflict since the events of October 7. Since then, the pro-Iranian Yemeni Houthis have launched regular drone and missile attacks on international vessels passing the Red Sea, targeting Western and Israeli ships and thus disturbing maritime security.

In this regard, it was further reported that Iran showed interest in purchasing a permanent naval base at the Sudanese Red Sea coast in exchange for additional assistance for the SAF. As of the time of publication, this request was declined by the SAF, as the military leadership could risk the support of other partners (such as Saudi Arabia and the US) if Iran is approved to preserve a regular presence in Sudan. Nevertheless, Iran could provide more military equipment if the SAF grants additional concessions. Thus, Iran’s interest in access to Sudan’s port infrastructure could remain vital. By gaining more control in Sudanese ports, Iran would potentially gain a foothold in a critically important commercial corridor with proximity to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

In light of the Israel-Gaza conflict and beyond, Iran considers its growing presence in Sudan as an element to win more strategic depth towards Israel. It could disrupt international maritime trade in the Red Sea in direct coordination with the Houthis in Yemen. As a consequence, Iran’s re-engagement with Sudan provides a strategic instrument in Tehran’s security policy. It traces back to historical ties that already existed before the cut in diplomatic relations back in 2016.

Under former Sudan’s President al-Bashir, who gained power in 1989 and served as Sudan’s president from 1993 until his ouster in 2019, Sudan and Iran enjoyed closer ideological and ideational ties with each other. During al-Bashir’s reign, advisers from the Iranian army and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) had reportedly been sent to Sudan to assist in the training of paramilitary forces. Additionally, Iran was Sudan’s top trading partner in the pre-2016 era.

On the other hand, the engagement in Sudan also poses a risk for Iran. First, it pours oil on the fire of local and regional escalation. In Sudan, growing military Iranian support for the SAF could intensify the clashes between the Sudanese military and the RSF, which would further harm the civilian population.

Some argue that the SAF could turn into a pro-Iranian proxy similar to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, with close military and ideological connections to their sponsors in Tehran. For instance, the SAF is supported by the Kizan group, led by Hassan al-Turabi, who presumably maintains close relations with Iran and other paramilitary groups that are suspected of pursuing Islamist ideologies.

Others do not consider such a scenario as realistic, as the supply of drones to the SAF only took place on a rather minimal scale. Second, a variety of external players are hedging their bets in Sudan in order to gain more influence in the war-torn country. Thus, players such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE are competing with each other to preserve particular interests in Sudan.

Iran’s Engagement in Sudan and Implications on its Relations with Saudi Arabia: Preserving the Modus Operandi or Risking the Status Quo?

The growing Iranian presence in Sudan in particular concerns the Saudi leadership, and could undermine the current de-escalation between both regional foes. Iran is interested in a modus operandi with Saudi Arabia in order to improve its regional position in times of socio-economic crisis and international isolation. This goal could be jeopardised if Iran’s military cooperation with the Sudanese army impacts both Sudan’s and the region’s stability, and undermines mitigation efforts supported by Saudi Arabia and other players.  In particular, Saudi Arabia’s engagement at the Horn of Africa and in Sudan is driven by three main interests:

1. Preserving the political legitimacy of the ruling family and the leaders;

2. Preserving economic interests; and

3. Preserving social resilience and national stability. As a key oil producer, the Red Sea and the Horn are of utmost geostrategic importance for Saudi Arabia’s oil trade and global supply chains.

Any instability in the region thereby directly affects the kingdom’s economic and security interests.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia is self-confidentially developing its own partnership model, which is based on pragmatic and opportunistic diversification, regional rapprochement and multi-alignment indicated by the diplomatic rapprochement with Iran. Without regional stability there can be no national progress, and without national progress there can be no political survival. Thus, since 2019, Riyadh is pursuing a course of equidistance in this time of global multipolarity. Consequently, the Saudi leadership has realised that animosities and tensions damage its own reputation and business model.

As foreign investment and the diversification of revenues constitute key pillars of its respective diversification agenda aimed at transforming the oil-reliant rentier state into a knowledge economy by investing into digital infrastructure, property, tourism, entertainment, logistics, healthcare, renewable energy and sports (‘Vision 2030’), preserving regional stability has become a geostrategic priority. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is also interested in creating multilateral forums. One example is the Red Sea Council, which was established in 2020 on Saudi initiative and includes Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. The forum has not been able to achieve significant results so far; however, it serves as a platform for Saudi Arabia to establish regional loyalties, to oppose potential rivals and, above all, to pursue common security interests.

The growing Iranian presence in Sudan hampers such Saudi ambitions: for Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea (and Sudan) is considered a strategic hinterland for its economic, security and logistical interests. For Saudi Arabia, it is essential that foreign investment flows into the country in order to realise its gigantic plans and giga projects, such as NEOM at the shores of the Red Sea. Furthermore, the plans to host the Asian Winter Games 2029, the Riyadh Expo 2030, and the FIFA World Cup 2034, which puts pressure on the kingdom to keep the direct neighborhood stable in order to attract tourists and fans from all across the world.

Unrest in the immediate neighborhood is detrimental to this plan, as the kingdom’s status as a safe investment location could suffer. Until 2022, the Houthis repeatedly attacked Saudi targets. Although this danger currently seems to have been averted, such strikes could flare up again. Should there be an open war between Israel and Hezbollah, attacks from Lebanon could also be directed against targets in Saudi Arabia. After all, Hezbollah has an arsenal of around 130,000 missiles. Hence, the growing Iranian presence in the direct neighbourhood of Saudi Arabia could feature prominently in its threat perception. Whatever destabilises the Horn, could destabilise Saudi Arabia – another reason for the kingdom’s interest in regional conflict management, rapprochement, and reconciliation.

The UAE in Sudan: Power Projection and Growing Competition with Iran

Finally, Iran’s growing presence in Sudan could further spur regional tensions in light of the Israel-Iran escalation and the UAE’s engagement in Sudan. The more Iran engages in Sudan and cooperates with the SAF, the more the Emirati policy of power projection could be damaged. For years, the UAE has seen itself as a shaping power in Africa. Consequently, it aims to improve its market access and extend its maritime network. Here, Sudan is of utmost importance. The UAE is the largest trading partner for Sudan: 45% of Sudan’s exports go to the UAE and 31% of Sudan’s imports come from the UAE. Furthermore, the UAE has invested in Sudan’s agricultural sectors. In addition, the Horn of Africa is considered a gateway to promising mineral and mining markets on the African continent that are of strategic interest to the UAE and other Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia. Through its logistical champions, DP World and the Abu Dhabi Ports Group, the UAE has invested in the expansion of commercial capacities, ports acquisitions and concessions, as well as maritime infrastructure across the Horn of Africa. Since 2006, the UAE has operated 12 port infrastructures in Africa.

Some examples include Algeria, Egypt, Djibouti, Berbera in Somaliland, Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola and Senegal to only mention a few. In Abu Amama in Sudan, a consortium led by Abu Dhabi Ports Group signed a preliminary agreement in 2022 with a volume of USD 6 billion for another port project. This “string of ports” strategy allows the UAE to access African economies and markets, with the Jebel Ali port in Dubai playing the role of a “super hub” linking the Arabian Sea, the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean to Latin America. Based on this assessment, the UAE aims to establish itself as a modern “Venice”. The Horn of Africa is thus a relevant strategic node in the UAE’s global maritime network of connectivity.

Through its investments in port infrastructure, the UAE has also extended its military leverage at the Horn of Africa. This logistical-military nexus has emerged as a strategic blueprint for the UAE’s engagement at the Horn, and also plays out in Sudan. Here, close links to General Hemedti and the RSF have become a highly controversial topic. For instance, the SAF criticised the attendance of UAE representatives in the Geneva talks. Back in June 2024, the Sudanese ambassador to the UN, Al-Harith Mohamed, accused the UAE of its entrenchment in the Sudanese conflict by providing weapons to the RSF.

The UAE side described his statement as ‘false accusations’. This episode shows that Sudan has emerged as a theatre for external players who seek to gain more political and economic leverage by supporting a variety of warring parties. Indeed, Sudan is geo-strategically of the utmost relevance for a number of regional actors such as Iran, but also the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

Grim Perspectives

Currently, perspectives for conflict mitigation in Sudan remain grim. The respective warring parties – in particular, the SAF and RSF – do not show any interest in de-escalation, and are following a ‘winner-takes-it-all’ approach at the cost of its suffering civilian population. Iran’s growing engagement thus intensifies the inner-Sudanese and regional powerplay, as Sudan is considered by several players as a theatre for power projection. In this regard, competition between Iran and the UAE is likely to increase, whereas Saudi Arabia is concerned about potential disruptive effects on its de-escalation efforts in times of growing regional tensions post-October 7.

In conclusion, the European Union's engagement with the situation in Sudan is not just a moral imperative but a strategic necessity to safeguard European interests considering the increasing number of regional and international players serving their diverse political, economic and security interests. The evolving dynamics in Sudan directly impact Europe's stability and influence in Africa and the Red Sea region. Therefore, we must ask: Is it time for a decisive and effective European role in Sudan? Or will European foreign policy continue to fall short, failing to reflect the true scope of Europe's interests and stature in this critical region?