Two years after the Brussels attacks, which left more than 30 casualties and more than 300 injured, many questions and challenges still persist both in Brussels and beyond. Ever since the numerous attacks on the European soil in the past years, the term ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent extremism’ have become central pieces to the EU counter-terrorism policy –making. The EU member states have strengthened their efforts on stemming ‘home-grown’ Islamist political violence and re-shifted their strategies to prevent new forms of terrorism [1].
New security measures, intelligence-sharing and new cooperation mechanisms at different levels have also been implemented in the past years. But Europe did not wake-up from a long nap after 9/11, as violent extremism is solidly rooted throughout the European history. Take for example the wide variety of movements in the early 70’s – far-left, far-right, separatists, social and religious, domestic and regional – that have entered in the realm of the European integration process and perpetrated attacks against civilians, spreading out extreme ideologies drenched not only in religion, but also in ethnics, politics and national factors [2].
These historic factors have apparently lost momentum and the concept of radicalization has led to the construction of being automatically related to a ‘Muslim’ issue, which shows limitations and biases. In the words of Arun Kundnani, ‘the concept of radicalization has become the master signifier of the late ‘war on terror’ and provided a new lens through which to view Muslim minorities’ [3].
This new and problematic trend comes from the narrow assumption that there are no explanatory accounts of violent extremism beyond the evil mindset of the perpetrators – who are the ‘other’, motivated by a fanaticism inherent to Islam. In this sense, a distinction is drawn between the ‘contemporary terrorism’, mainly seen as originating in Islamist extreme ideology, and the ‘terrorism from the past’, stemming from nationalist and far-right populism movements. On the latter, the question of radicalization is far less often posed, despite their re-emergence or re-awakening in the past years [4]. As for the former, it is very often depoliticized and seen as religiously inspired.
Challenging Conventional Wisdom
On the religious front, Olivier Roy points out that ‘the process of violent radicalization has little to do with religious practice, while radical theology, as Salafism, does not necessarily lead to violence’ [5], as the ultra-conservative movement have many branches. However, the conventional wisdom is that Salafism, especially the Wahhabi variant, has a strong connection with intolerance and violence, while Sufism is more tolerant and nonviolent. As many studies have demonstrated, some violent groups are Sufi and others Salafi, while some non-violent groups are Salafi, others Sufi [6].
In addition to that, different varieties of violence can be also found in other religious, such as Buddhism, Catholicism, etc. Preventing radicalization is essential to respond to and mitigate the perils of violence. But without recognizing the root causes of this issue and neglecting the other factors that accompany religious, counter-terrorism measures will be short-sighted and narrow. Most importantly, focusing on Islamist political violence or constructing the Muslim communities as ‘suspects’, will only create division and grievances. In understanding the root causes of radicalization, it is important to note that this phenomenon is not only religiously motivated, but it is a combination of many factors and other forms of dissent, be it political, behavioral, socio-economic or ideological [7].
In spite of its analytical and conceptual problems, radicalization continues to be a popular topic among many policy-makers in Europe and beyond. A different approach to ‘counter-radicalization’ should sought solutions to empower the youth, both at social and political levels, as well as a joint-up approach that incorporates local communities and grass-roots organizations at the forefront. As previously argued, the BIC-RHR believes that all relevant stakeholders must collaborate cross-sectorally to develop strategies together, reaching out to established civil society organizations working on the ground, as well as educational providers, religious leaders and policy makers [8].
But before any pragmatic initiatives, radicalization must be understood at its root causes and conceptualized as a kaleidoscope of factors, while avoiding reductionism, in order to develop alternative public narratives for a more holistic and inclusive strategy.
