Special Report 4 - Libya: Internal Displaced Persons and Refugees

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Ben Lowings
POLITICAL ANALYST

In Libya, no concrete political solution has been found despite many efforts coming from local actors or the international community. Due to the increasing internationalization and regionalization of the conflict, resolutions for a peaceful approach seem far away. Most importantly, the blurring lines between the political and security context have also created a challenge environment for civilians, the most affected as a result of the crisis.

Internal displacement, for instance, is a direct effect of the turbulent context within which civilians are living. Caveats and limitation of the sources make an accurate assessment of the situation even more challenging. According to the European Commission[1], 1.3 million people are in need of humanitarian aid in Libya. In addition to that, the displacement tracking matrix of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which analyses and provides a comprehensive overview of the latest numbers and mobility patterns of internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum seekers, migrants and returnees in the country, showed in their last report[2] that between March-April 2016, 417,123 people have been internally displaced.

The evolution of the conflict since 2011 has led to different waves of protracted IDP’s and a humanitarian emergency that alerts the international community.  In 2014, around 57,000 people were victims of protracted displacement (OCHA, 28 February 2014). In addition, the UNHCR figures show that among these there were around 40,000 Tawerghan IDPs from Tripoli and Benghazi. There has been also around 9,200 Libyans from the Mashashya, Qawalish and Sian tribes who moved in the Nafusa mountains according to the IDMC data base [3].Many Tawerghans (around 10,000) are also being re-displaced from one place to another, residing temporally in camps.

Most recently, despite the instability and insecurity, the situation of IDPs improved. The proportion of their dislocation is diminishing as some civilians have returned home towards the northern region. According to the IDMC, ‘there were more that 240 000 IDP’s in the country as of 4 May, down from 257 000 in March and 294 000 in February’. This is particularly due to ISIS and other terrorist organization’s defeat last year and consequently the decrease of fights in the region[4]. But the BIC-RHR is not entirely reassured since along with the returns we have observed 34,000 new displacements in the first half of the year.

Despite some small improvements in the north, potential for return to other areas remains challenging due to the overall instable situation. Given the constant inter-community tensions, lack of rule of law and loss of financial stability there is no immediate prospect for return to most of the internally displaced communities. This limbo has led a great part of IDPs and refugees to take the risk and embark in perilous journeys towards Europe, facing many challenges along the way. In 2016 alone, more than 160,000 took this route on makeshift boats[5]. In most cases, they pass through the Fezzan region, which is considered to be the Libyan regional crossroad that links the country’ southern border with the Mediterranean. In this sense, Libya is still a transit and destination country for migrants searching for a more stable and safer life.

According to the IOM data, as of August 2016 more than 278,327 migrants arrived in Europe by sea. Of them 106,461 migrants landed in Italy and 2,726 deaths were recorded[6]. This vicious and dangerous cycle has urged Europe to tackle the migration question by seeking the type of partnership it has built with Turkey, with the ultimate goal of preventing refugees from reaching the continent. But as it has been demonstrated, the EU-Turkey agreement over the migration crisis is flawed and does not address its root causes. Instead, it tends to worsen the situation, as many of these migrants are forced to return to where violence and instability reside.

The constant tragedies in the Mediterranean, coupled with the deteriorating security situation on the ground and the growing number of IDPs and refugees, make it necessary for a reassessment of how to respond to these challenges. Within the Libyan context, with its many challenges ahead, a number of constitutive actions are required for reaching a sustainable agreement among parties. These include first and foremost political willingness, financial assistance from partners and strengthen mediation as a durable solution to defuse tensions. As the BIC-RHR has argued, there won’t be any feasible and sustainable peace negotiations if only a small parcel of the parties involved in the conflict are present. Inclusiveness is one of the keys to sustainable and peaceful resolutions, as it has been recently recognized by the UN action plan to resume inclusive, Libyan-owned political process.

 

 

  • Launch a stabilization process of the economy through a gas and oil special Committee. The BIC believes that a substantial step to bring peace and structural stability is by finding a common denominator and point of interest among the parties involved. This common point is the reenergization of Libya’s economic development by expanding and developing legal channels of oil exploitation.
  • Safeguard Libyan refugees’ and IDPs rights to voluntary return and assist in their re-insertion in society.
  • All the parties should be brought together and strategies for engagement should be developed in a long-term framework. Opening lines of communication among the main actors, including former Gaddafi supporters, can be essential to assess whether other forms of engagement are feasible. In this way, a holistic and non-exclusive approach in terms of actors involved in negotiations is necessary.