“Demonising the other”: The Gaza war as a driver for polarisation between the Gulf and Europe.
In recent months, relations between the Arab world and Europe have faced challenges as a consequence of the Israel-Gaza war, which has resulted in more than 30,000 Palestinian casualties following the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7th, 2023. Despite efforts to engage in a diplomatic de-escalation, public debates are partly dominated by emotional polarisation and growing stigmatisation on both sides. In most of the Arab Gulf monarchies, on the one hand, Europe and the “West” in general are accused of double standards as they are turning a blind eye towards the misery of the Palestinians, taking mainly a pro-Israeli position. On the other hand, some European media portrays the Arab position as pro-Hamas, legitimising the October 7 attacks that killed more than 1,200. In addition, such debate is taking place in an atmosphere of growing global polarisation and instability, indicated by the intensified rivalry between China and the United States, ongoing disinformation campaigns by Russia, and destabilising efforts of regional players such as Iran.
Such a polarised climate of defamation and demonisation of the “other” has reached a climax in light of the Israel-Gaza war, but is not a new phenomenon. In the Gulf region, the feeling of retrenchment and isolation has increased in recent years, and states such as Saudi Arabia have expressed their frustration and discontent with the United States and Europe on several levels. First and foremost, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003 were considered in parts of the Arab world as devastating actions undermining regional stability and promoting extremism and terrorism, such as the rise of Daesh. In addition, the agreement of the US and European partners – with Iran on the latter’s nuclear program – further drove a wedge between the West and the Arab world.
Illustratively, In Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the nuclear agreement was perceived as a US betrayal, as the negotiating partners did not take into serious consideration the security concerns across the Gulf states. Instead, the nuclear deal provided Iran with a “carte blanche” to expand its regional influence in the direct neighbourhood of the Gulf states such as in Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. When two Saudi oil refineries were hit by presumably Iranian air strikes in September 2019, the Saudi government expected more military support by the US administration under then-President Donald Trump. However, concrete actions to strike back against Iran were considered too minimal. Subsequently, the Saudi leadership under Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman started to reach out directly to Iran, which resulted in the resumption of diplomatic ties in March 2023, facilitated by China.
Such an agreement exemplifies the growing trend in the Gulf region to promote regional de-escalation and conflict management. Hence, the assessment that the West – and in particular the United States – do not comprehensively protect the national security interests of the Gulf partners has resulted in a shift in foreign policymaking driven by more strategic autonomy, emancipation from the West, and partnership diversification indicated by closer cooperation with Western systemic rivals such as China and Russia. This trend gained further momentum after the Russian war on Ukraine started, with some Gulf monarchies showing some reluctance to take a clear anti-Russian stance, which was criticised by the US and several European countries.
The hot debate about the FIFA World Cup in Qatar 2022 also deepened the rift between the West and the Gulf region: in countries such as Germany, Qatar was criticised for human rights violations and a lack of football tradition, whereas the Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani accused this criticism as Western double standards and an unprecedented campaign. During the World Cup, the image of the West in the Arab world further diminished, and in public spaces such as social media, anti-Western sentiments became more prominent. In particular, the European accusations were labelled as hypocritical, disrespectful, Eurocentric and Islamophobic.
Finding ways to overcome polarisation: expectation management, essential honesty, and empathy.
Despite legitimate criticism on both sides, such an atmosphere of alienation and mistrust does not contribute to a solution for the manifold conflicts in the region, and does not serve the multiple security, economic, and political interests in Europe and the Gulf states. Instead, the people’s suffering in Gaza is needlessly prolonged, with several warmongers benefitting from such polarisation. Consequently, ways to enhance communication and dialogue on different levels are needed in order to present opposing perspectives in a respectful and constructive manner. Indeed, high-ranking diplomatic actions are taking place regularly, and diplomats and ministers from the US and Europe are engaging with their Arab counterparts. However, people-to-people exchanges are still limited. Therefore, the current crisis should also provide an opportunity to enhance communication channels between different parts of European and Arab Gulf societies to address fault lines and identify chances for future cooperation. Such dialogue should be driven by the following three key patterns:
Expectation management. So far, economic and energy policy interests have mainly dominated Europe-Gulf Arab relations. This economic prioritisation will continue as European businesses look into new markets in the Gulf region to diversify their partnerships. This trend has automatically turned more attention to the Gulf region, as the Gulf economies also heavily rely on foreign investment, technology, and expertise in order to successfully diversify their oil-dependent economies. Jobs must be created to offer their young populations an attractive future. Despite their increasing focus on Asian partners such as China, Korea and Japan and their rhetorical and political alienation from Europe, European companies still feature prominently in their partnership portfolio. Consequently, economic cooperation provides a relevant communication channel.
Politically, however, consistent expectation management should be promoted: the dilemma between export-oriented interests and the normative responsibility of pursuing a value-based policy can hardly be resolved in Europe, especially when dealing with the Gulf states. This should be considered in the discussions. Furthermore, it should be explained in more detail what capacities Europe (and the European Union) really must meet the high expectations of the Gulf states. In the Gulf monarchies, the impression prevails that some European countries – such as Germany, Europe’s most important economic power – almost automatically have the necessary capacities to pursue a proactive foreign and security policy. In many discussions in the Gulf states, people are shocked and irritated that Germany, despite its economic power, does not seem to be interested and/or capable of increasing its involvement in the region due to a lack of financial and human capacities, expertise, and institutional networks.
Furthermore, the historical background and multiple complexities of Germany’s close relations with Israel are hardly known in detail in the Gulf region and has not been comprehensively communicated from the German side, creating mistrust and deep concerns on both ends. This perception should be addressed by realistically presenting Germany’s and Europe’s security and foreign policy capacities to prevent too high expectations. Despite remaining diverging perspectives on the Israel-Gaza war and other conflicts, regional stability is in both Europe’s and the Gulf’s interest. It thus follows that Europe should fundamentally support efforts for de-escalation on all levels, while simultaneously raising more public awareness for its positions.
Since the Gulf region is gradually emancipating itself from the West and aims to find its own policymaking path in a multipolar world, Europe should not expect to gain too much leverage on regional developments and conflict resolution. Indeed, a long-term solution for the Israel-Gaza war cannot be achieved with the engagement of regional powers alone, needing substantial contributions from Europe and the United States. However, the more the West is accused of ignoring Gulf interests, the less the chances for constructive cooperation remain.
To improve the chances for long-term dialogue and conflict resolution, political decision-makers and the public sphere in Europe should therefore reflect more on those anti-European ressentiments to define more concisely in which areas closer cooperation is desired from the Gulf, and which policy areas are not suitable for it. Europe actually has limited levers of influence – a circumstance that is perceived realistically in the Gulf region but is sometimes hardly noticed in Europe. Instead of overestimating Europe’s influence, the question that should be increasingly asked is whether and in which areas the Gulf states want and need to work together with Europe – not on an economic level, but on a political one.
A clear-cut cost-benefit calculation would help to solve this dilemma; without interest there is no plan, and without clearly formulated goals, credible cooperation with the Gulf states is most likely to fail. In times of regional escalation, such cooperation should not be classified as an option, but rather as a priority. Otherwise, the catastrophic situation in Gaza will only deteriorate, which is neither in the interest of Europe nor of the Gulf states.
Honesty. It should, therefore, be clearly communicated between Europe and the Gulf states what is possible and what is not possible, what is wanted and what is not wanted. Red lines should be communicated honestly and openly to identify and discuss conflicting perceptions regarding human rights or regional alliances. The fact that this exchange can become unpleasant and inconvenient must be taken into account.
Too often, either polite phrases and diplomatic statements or emotional generalisations and clichés are expressed, which makes open and constructive dialogue difficult. To maintain a serious and constructive partnership, both Europe and the Gulf states should make more effort to talk to each other and articulate unpleasant views in a respectful manner based on coherent expectation management. Such a discourse is not likely to resolve diverging viewpoints on the Israel-Gaza war or on human rights issues, but it could open the option of changing perspectives and preventing whataboutism.
Empathy. In Europe, a lack of knowledge and expertise exists regarding the current fundamental social and political transformations in the Gulf region. Gulf societies find themselves in constant flux and are facing a number of socio-economic, social and cultural challenges. Regional crises such as the Israel-Gaza war increase the feeling of insecurity and mental fragility. In addition, the effects of climate change are much more dramatic in the Arab world than in wide parts of Europe, while the struggle for jobs, affordable housing and the compatibility of family and work concerns young people in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, or Kuwait in a similar way to those in Europe. In Europe, such transformation and the existing fault lines in Gulf societies are not consistently reflected, which further creates a vacuum in cultural sensitivity and understanding. For a balanced and nuanced debate about how to deal with the Gulf states and their foreign policymaking, it would be helpful to differentiate more clearly between state and society, and to focus on the complexities of social and socioeconomic transformation. Such a reflection requires empathy towards the societies of the Gulf states and their respective realities of life: levels of prosperity and education differ massively between countries such as Oman and Qatar, between individual regions of the country such as the Najd or the Hijaz in Saudi Arabia, and between urban and rural populations.
Unemployment, social frustration, and homelessness exist simultaneously alongside immense wealth and prosperity, and equal gender relations alongside patriarchal structures. These different levels of lifestyles and multiple realities characterise the complex constitution of the Gulf monarchies, and often remain hidden from external observers. Therefore, empathetic sensitivity is required when dealing with these phenomena, and at the same time, openness and tolerance to understand differences – on both the European and the Gulf sides.
Concrete action is needed: enhancing interdisciplinary and inclusive dialogue.
In times of growing global polarisation and populism, spaces for trustworthy dialogue are shrinking. Hence, experts in dialogue and mediation as well as conflict resolution initiatives, and think tanks should be encouraged to establish more platforms and projects aimed at bringing people from Europe and the Gulf region together. So far, Track Two diplomacy activities have gained prominence indicated by special projects focusing on Iran-Saudi dialogue or Yemen. However, more projects to engage partners from the Gulf region and Europe are needed to overcome existing stereotypes and work on a common understanding. Experts from academia and research, business, non-profit organisations, culture and arts, media, migration policies and development cooperation, sports, tourism, and entertainment need to discuss topics of mutual interest to identify chances for closer cooperation on an interdisciplinary level.
Certainly, the current polarisation creates tensions and a lack of understanding on both sides, but learning from and listening to each other seems more important than ever before. So far, many workshops, conferences, specialist trips or discussion forums still take place with a small group of the already established “usual suspects” and “opinion shapers” from research, policy advice, politics and the media, while new talent from both Europe and the Gulf region only gains access to these formats gradually. Too often, scientific, civil society and economic discourses take place separately in seemingly parallel universes, which prevents interdisciplinary exchange and public attention. Resultingly, the opportunity to listen to different perspectives is lost; therefore, it would be helpful to allow more local voices to participate in those forums.
Despite existing cleavages and diverging perspectives, it is only when communication between Europe and the Gulf region takes place on different levels by including different voices, from different disciplines, and with different perspectives and access to the respective political elites, that a more comprehensive dialogue may become possible in the quest to develop a sustainable and inclusive vision for regional stability and conflict resolution.